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LEGISLATIVE NOTE

OHIO REVISED CODE SECTION 3105.171: AN
EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION STATUTE MAINTAINING
JUDICIAL DISCRETION AND TRANSMUTATION
I.

INTRODUCTION

Recognizing the need for a modern approach to the division of
marital property upon divorce, the General Assembly of Ohio recently
enacted a bill revising and updating Ohio statutes addressing family
law issues.' The many provisions of this lengthy bill include a new statutory section, 3105.171, titled "Division of marital property; separate
property."' For the first time, Ohio law distinguishes property division
from spousal support (which was referred to as alimony in the previous
1. House Bill 514 amended the following sections of the Ohio Revised Code: 2199.03 (Powers of trustee); 2151.23 (Jurisdiction of juvenile court; order of child support); 2301.03 (Judges of
the division of domestic relations); 2303.201 (Additional fee for computerized legal research services); 2329.66 (Property that person domiciled in this state may hold exempt); 2743.66 (Payment
of awards; assignments); 2907.01 (Definitions); 3105.01 (Grounds for divorce); 3105.03 (Residence requirement and venue; jurisdiction of common pleas court); 3105.04 (Residence of spouse);
3105.06 (Notice by publication authorized in certain cases); 3105.091 (Conciliation order; procedure); 3105.10 (Power to dissolve marriage; enforcement of separation agreement providing for
child support; condonation and recrimination defenses eliminated; effect on dower); 3105.17
(Grounds for legal separation); 3105.18 (Spousal support); 3105.21 (Custody and support of children; support order); 3105.63 (Petition for dissolution; separation agreement); 3105.65 (Dismissal
of petition or approval of agreement and grant of dissolution; effect of decree; continuing jurisdiction; modification of spousal support; conversion of dissolution action into divorce actions);
3109.04 (Court awarding custody; joint custody; modifications; best interest of child); 3109.05
(Factors determining amount of support; support orders; medical needs); 3109.06 (Certification to
juvenile court); 3111.06 (Jurisdiction); 3113.21 (Payment of support through withholding of personal earnings, workers' compensation benefits, unemployment compensation benefits, retirement
benefits, or bank account; revised or modified orders; hearings; investigations; bond; order requiring employment; time limits for case completion; temporary orders; referee's powers; definitions);
3113.215 (Calculation of amount of child support obligation); 3117.05 (Petition for conciliation;
form; absence of fees); 3117.07 (Other actions stayed pending conciliation); 3117.08 (Transfer
and disposition of conciliation matters; jurisdiction); 3517.13 (Prohibited activities); 3770.071
(Winner to state under oath whether or not he is in default of support order; hearing; deduction
order); 5101.31 (Bureau of child support; fees; rules). 1990 Ohio Legis. Serv. 5-800 (Anderson).
2. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3105.171 (Anderson Supp. 1990). While Governor Richard
Celeste signed Amended Substitute House Bill on August 13, 1990, section 3015.171 did not
become effective until January 1, 1991. 1990 Ohio Legis. Serv. 5-800 (Anderson).
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statute) and defines property division and spousal support in separate
statutory sections. Section 3105.171 is limited exclusively to property
division. That statute defines both marital property and separate property,4 aligning the Ohio statutory scheme with other common law property states.5

3. Before section 3105.171 became effective, Ohio simply had one statute, 3105.18, governing both property division and alimony in divorce and separation cases. OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 3105.18 (Anderson 1988), amended by OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3105.18 (Anderson Supp..
1990); See id. §§ 3105.171, .18. "[Slection 3105.171 of the Revised Code . . . modif[ies] the
domestic relations law to provide for spousal support and the division of marital property and
separate property instead of for alimony ...." 1990 Ohio Legis. Serv. 5-800 (Anderson). The
term alimony no longer appears in the Ohio Revised Code. That apparently now antiquated term
is replaced by the new phrase "spousal support." OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3105.18 (Anderson
Supp. 1990). The considerations relevant to an award of spousal support are contained in the
revised section of 3105.18. Id. Ohio Revised Code section 3105.18, as amended, provides for
spousal support. Id. Ohio Revised Code section 3105.171 provides for property division. Id. §
3105.171.
Ohio does not recognize the community property approach to property division. Community
property states provide both spouses with "an existing interest in the assets of the community
.
2. HOMER H. CLARK, JR., THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES §
16.1, at 177 (practitioner's 2d ed. 1988). Today, eight states follow the community property approach: Arizona, California, Idaho, Louisiana, Nevada, New Mexico, Texas, and Washington. Id.
at 177 n.10. For an examination of the pertinent legislation, see ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25.318
(1991), CAL. CIV. CODE § 4800 (West Supp. 1991), IDAHO CODE § 32-713 (1983), LA. REV.
STAT. Ann. § 9:374 (West 1991), NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 125.150 (Michie. 1989), N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 40-4-7 (1989), and WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.09.080 (Supp. 1991).
4. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3105.171 (Anderson Supp. 1990).
5. While the common law property states remain varied as to division methods, the rationale underlying common law division is that "each spouse owns the property standing in his name."
CLARK, supra note 3, § 16.1, at 177.
Property division and spousal support are typically considered under separate statutes, and
marital and separate property are commonly defined in the statute. For the statutory authority
granting property division in the common law states, see ALA. CODE § 30-2-51 (1989); ALASKA
STAT. § 25.24.160 (1983); COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-10-113 (1989); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b81 (West 1986); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 1513 (1981 & Supp. 1990); D.C. CODE ANN. § 16910 (1981); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-5-13 (Michie 1991); HAW. REV. STAT. § 580-47 (1985 & Supp.
1989); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, para. 503 (Smith-Hurd 1980 & Supp. 1991); IND. CODE ANN. §
31-1-11.5-11 (West Supp. 1991); IOWA CODE ANN. § 598.21 (West 1981 & Supp. 1986); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 60-1610 (Supp. 1990); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.190 (Baldwin 1990); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 722-A (West 1981 & Supp. 1990); MD. FAM. LAW CODE ANN. § 8-201
(1984 & Supp. 1990); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 208, § 34 (West Supp. 1991); MICH. COMP.
LAWS ANN. § 25-552.401 (West 1988); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518.58 (West Supp. 1987); Mo.
ANN. STAT. § 452.330 (Vernon 1986); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-202 (1989); NEa. REV. STAT. §
42-365 (1988); NH. REV. STAT. ANN. § 458:19 (Supp. 1990); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:34-23 (West
Supp. 1991); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 234 (McKinney 1991); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-20 (1987):
N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-05-24 (1991); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1278 (West 1988); OR. REV.
STAT. § 107.105.(1990); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3501 (1991); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-5-16.1
(1988); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-420 (Law. Co-op 1985 & Supp. 1990); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §
25-4-44 (Supp. 1991); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-4-121 (1991); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.63 (West
Supp. 1991); UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-5 (Supp. 1991); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 751 (1989); VA.
CODE ANN. § 20-107.3 (Michie Supp. 1991); W. VA. CODE § 48-21 (1986); WIS. STAT. ANN. §
767.255 (West 1981 and Supp. 1990); WYo. STAT. § 20-2-114 (1987).
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol17/iss2/28
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This note will provide a working knowledge of Ohio's new property
division law by contrasting the new statute with the superseded law.
This note will trace the evolution of property division and spousal support to the enactment of the present law. This will be augmented by a
detailed explanation of Ohio common law concerning property division
and a detailed summary of the relevant sections of the new statute.
Finally, the note will focus on four statutory provisions which the drafters of the legislation felt were of particular importance: the maintenance of judicial discretion; the requirement that courts make specific
written findings of fact; transmutation; and the distributive award.
II. BACKGROUND
Before 1991, property division and alimony were both considered
under section 3105.18 of the Ohio Revised Code. 6 This former statute,
which on its face appeared only to address alimony, could not adequately encompass the property settlement considerations. To compensate for the inadequate consideration of property division, the drafters
of the former statute granted judges broad discretionary powers in adjudicating divorce claims. Judges exercised their discretionary powers
and, consequently, divorce claims lacked predictability. The lack of
predictability stemmed from judicial discretion and the differing interpretations about the purposes of property division 7 and alimony
awards 8 in divorce claims. When dividing property, courts looked to the
parties' past relationship and attempted to give the parties what equitably belonged to them. 9 When awarding alimony, in contrast, courts
considered the parties' future circumstances so that their future needs
could be adequately compensated.'
A.

The Former Statute 3105.18

Ohio's divorce jurisprudence was influenced by the English common law. 1 Early divorces in Ohio12 resulted from special acts of the
6. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3105.18 (Anderson 1988), amended by OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 3105.18 (Anderson Supp. 1990). Section 3105.18 was titled "Allowance of alimony; factors
determining nature, amount, and manner of payment; continuing jurisdiction; modification; enforcement orders; contempt." Id.; see also discussion supra note 3.
7. "The purpose and function of the division of property was ... to give each spouse that
property which he or she equitably owned, recognizing that in marriage the title to property often
does not correspond to the rights of ownership." CLARK, supra note 3, § 16.1, at 181.
8. "The purposes and functions of alimony are usually said to be the maintenance and support of the spouse and indirectly, of the children of the marriage." Id. (citations omitted).
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. The American practice of providing alimony awards to divorcing spouses was adopted
from English ecclesiastical law as it existed before the enactment of the Divorce Act of 1857.
Published
bysupra
eCommons,
17.1, at 220. "To obtain a divorce in early England, one went to the
note 3, §1991
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Ecclesiastical Courts. Marriage was made in Heaven, confirmed in Church, went to pot in the
house, and terminated in the Canonical Courts - not common law courts." ROBERT D. WALKER.
OHIO DIVORCE, ANNULMENT, ALIMONY, DISSOLUTION AND CHILD CUSTODY § 8.2, at 64 (1981).
The Ecclesiastical court system was part of the old English court structure. Id. These courts
abided by the canonical law, and addressed matters that were spiritual or religious in nature. Id.;
see also Wolfe v. Wolfe, 350 N.E.2d 413, 417 (Ohio 1976); Chester G. Vernier & John B. Hurlbut, The Historical Background of Alimony Law And Its Present Statutory Structure, 6 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 197, 198 (1939). Regarded as a sacrament, marriage was thought to be indissoluble in nineteenth-century England. Vernier & Hurlbut, supra, at 197. Marriage was declared
an indissoluble bond in the fifth century by the Council of Carthage. JOYCE H. GREEN, ET AL..
DISSOLUTION OF MARRIAGE § 1.07 (1986). The ecclesiastical courts, thus, had jurisdiction over
matrimonial claims. Vernier & Hurlbut, supra, at 197.
These courts had the authority over two legal processes popularly known as divorces. GREEN,
ET AL., supra, at § 1.07. The first legal process was a divorce a mensa et thoro. Within the context
of divorce a mensa et thoro, which translated literally means "from bed and board only," the
spouses essentially remained spouses. WALKER, supra, § 8.3, at 69. Pursuant to a divorce a mensa
et thoro, husband and wife were permitted to live apart, but remained bound by their marriage
bond. CLARK. supra note 3, § 17.1, at 220. This was not regarded as a total divorce. "[A] divorce
a mensa et thoro is not terminable in a quantum of months or years but is terminated only upon
death." WALKER, supra, § 8.3, at 69. Remarriage was forbidden within the context of a divorce a
mensa et thoro. GREEN, ET AL., supra, § 1.07. Such a divorce typically represented a judicial
separation and could be granted as a result of a spouse's gross misconduct, typically adultery or
cruelty. Vernier & Hurlbut, supra, at 197; GREEN, ET AL., supra, § 1.07. The second process,
divorce a vinculo matrimonii rendered a marriage invalid "because of some impediment existing
at the time of the marriage." Vernier & Hurlbut, supra, at 197-98. A divorce a vinculo matrimonii was essentially an annulment, where the court found that no marriage ever existed because of a forbidden impediment existing at the time of the marriage. Id. at 198. "This process
was abused by people in unhappy marriages with the necessary wealth and influence to secure a
decision from an ecclesiastical court that no true marriage ever existed." GREEN, ET AL.. supra, §
1.07.
The third process tolerated by canon law, an absolute divorce, could only be granted by a
private Act of Parliament. Id.; see also James P. Kelly, Marriage, Divorce and Annulment, 4
JURIST 246, 273 (1944) (complete discussion of these three exceptions); Vernier & Hurlbut,
supra, at 198.
Alimony awards were granted in the divorce a mensa et thoro where the husband was the
guilty party. Vernier & Hurlbut, supra, at 198. The authority of the ecclesiastical courts to award
alimony stemmed strictly from the husband's common law duty to support his wife and not from
the canonical law. Id. at 198-201; see also WALKER, supra, § 8.2, at 65. "Then, as now, pecuniary
provision for the injured wife was necessary as a matter of social economy." Vernier & Hurlbut,
supra, at 198. These alimony awards were considered permanent and fulfilled the purpose of providing continued support and maintenance for the wife. Id. The ecclesiastical courts, however, did
not award permanent alimony to a guilty wife who was granted a divorce a mensa et thoro nor did
they award women permanent alimony after a divorce a vinculo matrimonii. Id. at 199, 201.
Parliamentary precedent is responsible for the shift away from this limited use of permanent alimony. The Parliament recognized "that a guilty wife may starve as quickly as an innocent one
. . .. "Id. at 199. Following a parliamentary divorce, the husband was typically required to provide his guilty wife with a monetary provision sufficient for her sustenance before he would be
granted the divorce. Id. This was a significant step toward the alimony award as it is known today.
An important historic justification for alimony awards was the early property laws. Id. at
198; CLARK, supra note 3, § 17.1, at 221; WALKER, supra, § 8.2, at 64-65; see also Wolfe, 350
N.E.2d at 418. The Ohio Supreme Court stated: "a major reason for awarding 'alimony' was to
offset the harsh effects of the early property laws, under which a wife was incapable of holding
property and all her rights to her personal property acquired before and after marriage became
her husband's property." Wolfe, 350 N.E.2d at 418. Once married, the doctrine of coverture subhttps://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol17/iss2/28
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Ohio General Assembly. 3 General statutes later replaced this method
of granting divorce."
In 1953, the Ohio General Assembly enacted section 3105.18 of
the Revised Code15 which governed alimony awards."6 While this stat-

ordinated all of a woman's property rights to her husband. GREEN. ET AL., supra, § 10.02. "[Tlitle
to virtually all the wife's personalty vested in the husband upon marriage and remained in him
upon divorce." Id. Further, Professor Clark noted that alimony awards were necessary because
there were few employment opportunities for the married woman. CLARK, supra note 3, § 17.1, at
221. As a more subtle solution to amending the existing property laws, courts chose to provide
women with an alimony award when their marriage resulted in divorce. Vernier & Hurlbut,
supra, at 198; see also Wolfe, 350 N.E.2d at 418. "Early cases involve alimony awards to a
current spouse (while separated or during the pendency of a divorce proceeding) .... " Wolfe,
350 N.E.2d at 418. Later, courts made permanent alimony awards following a final divorce. Id.
12. See, e.g., The divorce of Hannah from Isaac Willis, 2 Ohio Laws 67 (1804).
13. E.g., 38 Ohio Laws 37 (1840); 29 Ohio Laws 431 (1824).
14. E.g., I S. & C. 509 (1860); OHIO GEN. CODE ANN. § 11979 (Page's 1926). That statute
provided a list of nine causes for which divorce may be granted:
Courts of common pleas may grant divorce for the following causes:
1.That either party had a husband or wife living at the time of the marriage from
which the divorce is sought;
2. Wilful absence of either party from the other for three years;
3. Adultery;
4. Impotency;
5. Extreme cruelty;
6. Fraudulent contract;
7. Any gross neglect of duty;
8. Habitual drunkenness for three years;
9. The imprisonment of either party in a penitentiary under sentence thereto. The
petition for divorce under this clause must be filed during the imprisonment of the
adverse party;
10. The procurement of a divorce without this state, by husband or wife, by virtue
of which the party who procured it is released from the obligations of the marriage,
while they remain binding upon the other party.
OHIo GEN. CODE ANN. § 11979 (Page's 1926).
15. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3105.18 (Anderson 1988), amended by OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 3105.18 (Anderson Supp. 1990).
16. Section 3105.18 of the Ohio Revised Code provided in pertinent part:
(A) In divorce, dissolution of marriage, or alimony proceedings, the court of common
pleas may allow alimony it considers reasonable to either party.
The alimony may be allowed in real or personal property, or both, or by decreeing a
sum of money, payable either in gross or by installments, as the court considers equitable.
(B) In determining whether alimony is necessary, and in determining the nature,
amount and manner of payment of alimony, the court shall consider all relevant factors,
including but not limited to, the following:
(1)The relative earning abilities of the parties;
(2) The ages, and the physical and emotional conditions of the parties;
(3) The retirement benefits of the parties;
(4) The expectancies and inheritances of the parties;
(5) The duration of the marriage;
(6) The extent to which it would be inappropriate for a party, because he will
be custodian of a minor child of the marriage, to seek employment outside the
home;
Published by eCommons,
1991of living of the parties established during the marriage;
(7) The standard
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ute did not address property division, courts interpreted the statute as
encompassing property division. This had the effect of giving the alimony award two distinctly different components."' Ohio judges and
practitioners recognized two distinctly different types of alimony.18
Thus, Ohio courts relied on one statute, designed only to address sustenance alimony, to fashion alimony awards and divide property. 9
Before determining whether sustenance alimony should be
awarded under section 3105.18, the court would first divide the property.2" Using the eleven factors enumerated in the statute, 22 the court
was expected to determine an appropriate alimony award in each

(8) The relative extent of education of the parties;
(9) The relative assets and liabilities of the parties;
(10) The property brought into the marriage by either party;
(11)The contribution of a spouse as a homemaker.
(C) In an action brought solely for an order for alimony under section 3105.17 of the
Revised Code, any continuing order for periodic payments of money entered pursuant to
this section is subject to further order of the court upon changed circumstances of either
party.

Id.
17. "It is unfortunate that Ohio has seen fit to lump sustenance and support and division of
property into one all inclusive word 'alimony' when the former word of art, 'alimony,' was used to
refer exclusively to sustenance and nourishment." WALKER, supra note 11, § 8.3, at 71; see also
infra note 18 and supra note 11 (for further discussion of the term alimony).
18. "Although some courts and practitioners have used and continue to use the term 'alimony' to mean sustenance and support alimony and the term 'property division' as a category
separate from alimony, it is now clear that property-division alimony and sustenance alimony are
both types of alimony." Pacht v. Jadd, 469 N.E.2d 918, 920 (Ohio Ct. App. 1983).
"['A]imony' is composed of two separate elements - alimony which constitutes a division of
the marital assets and liabilities, and alimony consisting of periodic payments for sustenance and
support." Cherry v. Cherry, 421 N.E.2d 1293, 1297 (Ohio 1981). "Courts have long recognized
that the monetary provision made for wives at divorce casts a mixed hue of 'alimony' and a division of property." Wolfe v. Wolfe, 350 N.E.2d 413, 421-22 (Ohio 1976); see also Kaechele v.
Kaechele, 518 N.E.2d 1198, 1220 (Ohio 1988); State ex rel. Cook v. Cook, 64 N.E. 567, 568-69
(Ohio 1902) (where the court recognized that an alimony award can take the form of real property, personal property, or money); Weidman v. Weidman, 48 N.E. 506, 507 (Ohio 1897) (upon
divorce, a woman is entitled to an "equitable share of the property as alimony").
19. "[T]he revised statute [3105.18] . . .does not specifically deal with the authority of the
court to divide property. That function is reinforced by judicial decisions holding that division may
be made when done pursuant to awards of alimony." John R. Milligan, Guidelines In Alimony
And Support For Ohio, 52 THE OHIO BAR 2009, 2012 (1979).
To lump together alimony for sustenance and nourishment and alimony for property
division is not semantically correct or legally sound. It is one thing for a legislature to be so
imprecise but quite another for a court of last resort to compound the felony in ruling upon
such legislation. The terms are separate and so should be awards for a division of property
and alimony in the classic sense.
WALKER, supra note 11,§ 8.3, at 71-72.
20. Wolfe, 350 N.E.2d at 423. "Only after a division of property is made, is the court
statutorily authorized to consider whether an additional amount is needed for sustenance, and for
what period will such necessity persist." Id.
21. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3105.18(B)(l)-(l1); see also supra note 16.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol17/iss2/28
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case. 22 . However, there were no guidelines provided within the text of

section 3105.18 to assist courts in the application of the eleven factors,
and it was unclear which factors applied to property alimony and
which applied to sustenance alimony. A designation of which of the
eleven factors applied to property alimony and which applied to sustenance alimony was missing from the text of the statute because the
statute was only designed to address sustenance alimony and not property division. 2a This problem, further compounded by the courts' failure
to classify awards as either sustenance alimony or property alimony,
caused great variance in alimony awards.
Due to the lack of clarity in the statute, courts exercised considerable discretion in applying this statute. 24 This discretion led to disparity
in alimony awards across the state and even within the same county.
Practitioners could never be sure which of the eleven factors the judge
would use to settle a case, which factors were considered pertinent to
the alimony award, and which factors were relevant to the property
division.25 Moreover, section 3105.18 did not hold judges accountable
for their decisions. They were not required to articulate which of the
eleven factors they deemed relevant to a particular case, nor which factors they relied upon for the determination of the alimony award or the
property division. 26 While judicial discretion is both desirable and necessary when adjudicating family law matters,2 7 too much discretion is
as dangerous as too little.

22.

Wolfe, 350 N.E.2d at 423.

23.

In Wolfe, the court stated:

Many of those factors have little relevance to a possible need for sustenance, e.g., the duration of the marriage, the standard of living of the parties established during the marriage,
the property brought to the marriage by either party, the contribution of a spouse as a
homemaker, and the relative situation of the parties. On the other hand, those factors are
quite pertinent to considerations of the distributions of marital assets and liabilities - the
property settlement.
Id. at 423.
24. 1 JOHN GILCHRIST, ANDERSON'S OHIO FAMILY LAW § 24.11, at 389 (2d ed. 1989).
"[T]he allowance of alimony is within the sound discretion of the trial court .... " Id.; see also
Cherry v. Cherry, 421 N.E.2d 1293, 1298-99 (Ohio 1981) (the importance of granting the trial
court discretion when determining what constitutes an equitable division of property); Wolfe, 350
N.E.2d at 423.
25. Ohio Family Law Seminar (1990) (discussing the changes in property division in Ohio
under section 3105.171) (available from Professional Education Systems, Inc.) [hereinafter
Seminar].
26.

Id.
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Judicial Interpretationof Section 3105.18

Two Ohio Supreme Court decisions illustrate a very broad reading
of section 3105.18 and its terms.2 8 In the earlier decision, Wolfe v.

Wolfe, the court analogized the marital relationship to one of a partnership. 9 "The court must approach the proceeding much like a suit in
partition or an action to dissolve, windup and distribute the assets and
liabilities of a partnership."30 With this statement, the supreme court
in Wolfe advocated a theory of equitable distribution upon divorce. 3 1
This theory of marriage as a partnership influenced the court's approach to allocating rights and responsibilities to the parties in a divorce proceeding.32 The Ohio Supreme Court's recognition of marriage
as a partnership affected the concepts of marital and nonmarital property. While courts have jurisdiction over all property, 3 they typically
follow the practice of awarding all nonmarital property to the appropriate owner and dividing only marital property equitably between the
spouses."' Property acquired individually and not intended to be shared

28. Cherry, 421 N.E.2d at 1298-99; Wolfe, 350 N.E.2d at 423.
29. Wolfe, 350 N.E.2d at 422. In Wolfe, the court reached this conclusion after a detailed
examination of three early Ohio cases that involved actions for divorce and alimony. Id. These
cases recognized that a husband and wife's accumulated property is generally a result of the joint
efforts of each party. State ex rel. Cook v. Cook, 64 N.E. 567, 568-69 (Ohio 1902); Weidman v.
Weidman, 48 N.E. 506, 507 (Ohio 1897); Tolerton v. Willard, 30 Ohio St.. 587-88 (1876). The
court, in each of these three cases, held that upon the dissolution of the marriage relationship the
wife is entitled to "a just and equitable proportion of the whole ....
" Cook, 64 N.E. at 568; see
also Weidman, 48 N.E. at 507; Tolerton, 30 Ohio St. at 587-88.
30. Wolfe, 350 N.E.2d at 422. "Current solutions for resolving the unfairness and unpredictability of contemporary divorce practice urge courts to manage the dissolution of marital contracts in ways essentially identical to the foregoing statements of this court circa 1876-1902." Id.
at 422-23.
31. Id. at 421-22. For examples of early Ohio cases citing this proposition see Piatt v. Piatt,
9 Ohio 37 (1939), denying an ex-husband's argument that alimony can only be provided when the
relationship of the husband and wife exists, and Cox v. Cox, 19 Ohio St. 502 (1869), denying an
ex-husband's argument that a claim for alimony can only be asserted during the marriage
relationship.
[P]ost-marital alimony awards entered Ohio jurisprudence without fanfare, and absent a
discernible conscious judicial origin. Alimony beyond notions of sustenance, and beyond the
banns of matrimony, arrived, as Sandburg's fog, on little cat feet, unscrutinized by our
sagacious predecessors against the standard of fundamental fairness.
Wolfe, 350 N.E.2d at 420 (footnote omitted).
32. Wolfe, 350 N.E.2d at 422. The original notion of marriage as a partnership should be
credited to the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act (UMDA), promulgated in 1971 by the National Conference of Commissioners on the Uniform State Laws. UNIF. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE
ACT, 9A U.L.A. 147 (1973). When introduced, the premise of the UMDA was quite innovative:
"[t]he distribution of property upon the termination of marriage should be treated, as nearly as
possible, like the distribution of assets incident to the dissolution of a partnership." Id. at 149.
33. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3105.011 (Anderson 1988).
34. BALDWIN'S OHIO DOMESTIC RELATIONS LAW § 25.01 (Supp. 1990) [hereinafter OHIO
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between the spouses is considered nonmarital property. 3 5 All other
property is presumed to be marital property3 6 and subject to division by
the court. 7
Since the partnership theory perceives marriage as the union of
two independent people, each having individual identities and equal
standing in working toward a mutual goal,3 8 it logically follows that the
only property subject to division upon divorce or dissolution is property
obtained as a result of the earnings or production of the partnership. 39
The point of distinction between marital and nonmarital property, however, is often blurred." In theory, the Ohio Supreme Court's pronouncement in Wolfe, that property should be divided according to its
character, appeared to be a sound approach. Ohio courts were to divide
marital property equitably between spouses under the provisions of section 3105.18. While the theory appeared sound, its application under
section 3105.18 was flawed. Quite simply, the conjunction of the Wolfe
approach and the discretionary factors of section 3105.18 provided no
predictable results for claims adjudicated under the statute. 1
Although the provisions of section 3105.18 did not distinguish between alimony and property division, the Wolfe court and commentators attempted to determine which of the eleven factors in the statute
should be applied to alimony awards and which should be applied to

35. Id. § 25.02, at 40. "[P]roperty which comes to either party by avenues other than as a
consequence of their mutual efforts is not intended to be shared and is presumed to be nonmarital
property." Id.
36. "In practice, marital property is presumed to include all property owned by either or
both parties at the time of divorce, regardless of title. This presumption may be overcome-by proof
that the property was acquired before the marriage or by inheritance, gift, etc." Id. § 25.01, at 39.
37. Id. The court could divide nonmarital property if such action was necessary to achieve
an equitable division. Id. Courts almost never divided nonmarital property "in the absence of
special circumstances requiring restitution or indemnification as distinguished from the division of
property per se." Id.
38. Id.; see also Wolfe v. Wolfe, 350 N.E.2d 413, 421-22 (Ohio 1976).
39. OHIO DOMESTIC RELATIONS LAW. supra note 34, § 25.01, at 39. Title is a factor often
considered by the courts when characterizing property as marital or nonmarital; however, it is not
determinative. Maurer v. Maurer, No. 10029 (Ohio 2d App. Dist. Mar. 13, 1987) (LEXIS, States
library, Ohio file); see also OHIO DOMESTIC RELATIONS LAW, supra note 34, § 25.01, at 39.
40. In the case of Worthington v. Worthington, appellee based his argument that the appreciation in value of nonmarital property is not marital property upon Principles And Guidelines For
The Division of Property In Actions For Divorce In Ohio. 488 N.E.2d 150, 152 n.l (Ohio 1981).
In response to appellee's argument, the court reiterated that flat rules have no place in determining property division between divorcing spouses. Id. at 153. "[A] formulaic division of property is
virtually an impossible task for the trial court." Id. The court denied appellee's argument and
reversed the judgment of the court of appeals, finding that the trial court correctly considered all
factors identified-in section 3105.18, and also the additional factors which were relevant in this
particular case. Id. at 153-54.
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property divisions."2 In Wolfe, Justice Brown observed that some of the
factors in 3105.18 have little connection to the considerations for sustenance alimony."3 He also noted that other factors seemed readily applicable to considerations for property divisions." Some courts mistakenly
interpreted the 'holding that marriage is a partnership to mean that
marital property should be divided equally between the spouses.4 6
Other courts interpreted the holding that the eleven factors would determine the division of property to mean that property should be di42. Wolfe, 350 N.E.2d at 421. Commentators also attempted to determine what factors
should be applied. See, e.g., Milligan, supra note 19, at 2009; Domestic Relations Division, Court
of Common Pleas, Cuyahoga County, Principles and Guidelinesfor the Division of Property in
Actions for Divorce in Ohio, 54 THE OHIO BAR 491, 491 (1982) [hereinafter Domestic Relations
Division].
43. Justice Brown felt that the length of the marriage, the parties' standard of living,
spousal contribution as a homemaker and the retirement benefits of either of the parties had little
relevance to the need for sustenance alimony. Wolfe, 350 N.E.2d at 423.
44. Id. Additionally, a group of judges in Cuyahoga'County produced an influential article
presenting their interpretation of property division within the statutory framework of section
3105.171. See Domestic Relations Division, supra note 42, at 491. The outline of this article
provides a quick and helpful understanding of its contents.
Part One: Marital and Nonmarital Property
I. Nonmarital Property
II. Marital Property
III. Transmutation of Property
IV. Specific Kinds of Property
Part Two: Valuation of Marital Property
I. Kinds of Value
II. Valuation Dates
111. Adjustments to Value
IV. Valuation of Specific Property
Part Three: Debts and Liquidation Expense
1. Debts
II. Legal Expense
Part Four: Division of the Marital Property
I. Presumption of Equitable Division
II. Circumstances May Rebut the Presumption of Equal Division
Ill. Considerations Relative to the Manner of Division
Id. at 495. A closer examination of this outline, in conjunction with the newly enacted section
3105.171, shows several similarities. This is a simple illustration of the impact that the judges'
article had on the Ohio courts.
45. See. e.g., Cherry v. Cherry, 421 N.E.2d 1293, 1297 (Ohio 1981); Vance v. Vance, No.
80-CA-I (Ohio 5th App. Dist. July 16, 1980) (LEXIS, States library, Ohio file) (case reversed by
court of appeals because trial court made an unequal division of marital property). In Cherry v.
Cherry, the court of appeals reversed the decision of the trial court, citing Wolfe as the controlling
authority, because the trial court made an unequal division of the marital property. Cherry, 421
N.E.2d at 1295. The court of appeals found that the trial court abused its discretion by "failing to
make a substantially equal division of property." Id.; Cherry v. Cherry, No. 40377 (Ohio 8th App.
Dist. Aug. 20, 1981) (LEXIS, States library, Ohio file) (appellant argued that trial court abused
its discretion by failing to make a substantially equal property division); see also Woods v. Woods,
No. 79-CA-2 (Ohio 12th App. Dist. Aug. 15, 1980) (LEXIS, States library, Ohio file) (appellant
citing Wolfe as authority for the proposition that the trial court abused its discretion in making an
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol17/iss2/28
unequal property division).
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vided equitably between the spouses.4 Thus, the practitioner was often
in an awkward position when counseling clients or settling and appealing cases. 47 Clients often complained that their attorney had not represented their interests adequately because their friend in a nearby
county had received a substantially greater alimony award than they
had.4 8
The Ohio Supreme Court resolved the confusion between these
two differing interpretations of section 3105.18 in Cherry v. Cherry."9
In Cherry, the court set the standard that property was to be equitably
divided according to the eleven factors listed in the statute.5" "Wolfe
..."' The court stated:
does not mandate an equal property division .
1. There is no presumption, rebuttable or irrebuttable, that marital
property be divided equally upon divorce; rather, a potentially equal division should be the starting point of the trial court's analysis before it
considers the factors listed in R.C. 3105.18 and all other relevant
factors.
2. A Court of Common Pleas has broad discretion to determine
what property division is equitable in a divorce proceeding. The mere
fact that a property division is unequal, does not, standing alone, amount
to an abuse of discretion.

52

Under section 3105.18, an equal division should be the starting point in
the court's analysis of an alimony award, but the court is to use its
discretion when making that award, such that the award is equitable

46.

Cherry, 421 N.E.2d at 1290-99.

47.

Seminar, supra note 25.

48. Telephone Interview with Katherine Walsh, Chief Sponsor of House Bill 514 (Jan. 24,
1991); Telephone Interview with Kathy L. Ellison, Domestic Relations Attorney (Jan. 24, 1991).
49. 421 N.E.2d 1293 (Ohio 1981). "Cherry v. Cherry was a consolidation of four appeals of
alimony 'awards. In each of the four cases, the trial court ordered an unequal property division.
Each of the parties receiving the lesser award appealed, contending that an unequal property
division is an abuse of discretion under Wolfe v. Wolfe." Patricia D. Laub, Ohio Law SurveyFamily Law, 51 U. CIN. L. REV. 186, 197 (1982). For a review of the independent opinions consolidated in Cherry, see Cherry v. Cherry, No. 40377 (Ohio 8th App. Dist. Aug. 20, 1981) (LEXIS,
States library, Ohio file), Woods v. Woods, No. 79-CA-2 (Ohio 12th App. Dist. Aug. 15, 1980)
(LEXIS, States library, Ohio file), Vance v. Vance, No. 80-CA-I (Ohio 5th App. Dist. July 16,
1980) (LEXIS, States library, Ohio file), and Marisay v. Marisay, No. L-79-358 (Ohio 6th App.
Dist. June 20, 1980) (LEXIS, States library, Ohio file).
50.

Cherry, 421 N.E.2d at 1299.

51. Id. at 1297. "We hold that Wolfe does not mandate an equal property division, and that
the mere fact a property division is unequal, does not, standing alone, amount to an abuse of
discretion." id.
at 1294 (citations
Published52.by Id.
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and just when the eleven factors in the statute are considered in conjunction with the award.5 3 "Equitable need not mean equal."15
Much of the litigation over equitable distribution of property concerns the transmutation of property,5 5 which in turn largely depends on
the court's characterization of property as either marital or
nonmarital.5 6 Most commonly, nonmarital property is transmuted into
marital property when it loses its separate character. Property separately owned before the marriage or property given as a gift to one
party before or during the marriage is generally considered to be
nonmarital property.57 Gifts made within the context of a marriage relationship,5" as well as property owned prior to marriage, 59 are frequently the subject of dispute in property division when parties divorce.
Ohio courts relied on several theories to determine whether property changed character from nonmarital to marital in the course of a
marriage. 0 Case law demonstrates the lack of a uniform statutory ap53. "In using the partnership analogy, this court in Wolfe did not intend to create a presumption, rebuttable or irrebuttable, that property be divided equally upon divorce; rather, a potentially equal division should be the starting point of analysis for the trial court." Id. at 1298-99.
54. Kaechele v. Kaechele, 518 N.E.2d 1197, 1200 (Ohio 1988).
55. See CLARK, supra note 3, § 16.1, at 175. The author notes that property disputes are
the second most litigated aspects in divorce proceedings. Id. "The concept of transmutation is an
exception to the general rule that property acquired by a party prior to the marriage is not marital
property . . . .Transmutation is the process by whi*ch non-marital property has changed to marital property or vice versa." Furrow v. Furrow, No. 48741 (Ohio 8th App. Dist. Apr. I1,1985)
(LEXIS, States library, Ohio file); accord Jakab v. Jakab, No. 90-CA-02, 1991 Ohio App.
LEXIS 755 (Ohio 2d App. Dist. Feb. 22, 1991); Lewber v. Lewber, No. 90-CA-04, 1991 Ohio
App. LEXIS 375 (Ohio 2d App. Dist. Feb. 1, 1991); DiMeolo v. DiMeolo, No. 89-A-1469, 1991
Ohio App. LEXIS 224 (Ohio 1Ith App. Dist. Jan. 25, 1991); Kuehn v. Kuehn, 564 N.E.2d 97, 98
(Ohio Ct. App. 1988); Wiest v. Wiest, No. 1204, 1988 Ohio App. LEXIS 1240 (Ohio 2d App.
Dist. Mar. 30, 1988); Griesinger v. Griesinger, 31 Ohio B. 520 (1987); Kahn v. Kahn, 536 N.E.2d
678 (Ohio Ct. App. 1987); Tomlin v. Tomlin, No. 10094 (Ohio 2d App. Dist. Mar. 16, 1987)
(LEXIS, States library, Ohio file); Maurer v. Maurer, No. 10029 (Ohio 2d App. Dist. Mar. 13,
1987) (LEXIS, States library, Ohio file); Kay v. Kay, No. CA85-06-062 (Ohio 12th App. Dist.
Jan. 21, 1986) (LEXIS, States library, Ohio file); McDade v. McDade, No. 376 (Ohio 12th App.
Dist. Sept. 16, 1981) (LEXIS, States library, Ohio file). See generally OHIo DOMESTIC RELATIONs LAW. supra note 34, § 25.02; Domestic Relations Division, supra note 42, at 500-01.
56. OHIO DOMESTIC RELATIONS LAW, supra note 34, § 25.01.
57. DiMeolo v. DiMeolo, No. 89-A-1469, 1991 Ohio App. LEXIS 224 (Ohio 11th App.
Dist. Jan. 25, 1991). "[l1t is well-established under Ohio law that property which was nonmarital
in nature at the beginning of the marriage can lose its character during the course of the relationship." Id. at *4.
58. "As a general rule, properties acquired by gift, bequest, devise or descent are considered
nonmarital assets." Kuehn v. Kuehn, 564 N.E.2d 97, 99 (Ohio Ct. App. 1988).
59. Any property acquired by either spouse prior to marriage will commonly be treated as
nonmarital property by the courts. Palmer v. Palmer, 455 N.E.2d 1049, 1051 (Ohio Ct. App.
1982); Sanzenbacher v. Sanzenbacher, 444 N.E.2d 454, 455 (Ohio Ct. App. 1981); OHIO DOMESTIC RELATIONS LAW, supra note 34, § 25.02; Domestic Relations Division, supra note 42, at 496.
60. The theories of commingling and transmutation consistently appeared in court opinions,
cited in support of the courts' chosen characterization of property. See generally CLARK, supra
note 3, § 16.2, at 185.
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proach. Transmutation and commingling, while recognized by the Ohio
courts, were ignored by the legislature. Thus, Ohio courts adopted the
"source of funds" rule as the accepted approach to characterize marital
and nonmarital property.6 1
The source of funds rule examines the source of the contributions
made toward the property in question rather than considering the title
to the property'.2 This rule was the judicial response to the unfavored
presumption" that property jointly titled represented a gift to one
spouse.6 Courts adopting the source of funds rule claimed it allowed
for the consideration of equitable principles within the broad framework of transmutation. 6 The source of funds rule embodies five equitable principles:

61. While section 3105.18 of the Ohio Revised Code did not call upon the court to characterize property as either nonmarital or marital, such a characterization was necessary to effectuate
an equitable property division. The courts therefore turned to those states with marital property
statutes in force and borrowed their approach to the classification of property as either separate or
marital. "The cases in marital property states have generally chosen to follow this 'source of
funds' rule, allocating the property between separate and marital interests in proportion to the
contributions from separate and marital sources." CLARK, supra note 3, § 16.2, at 186 (citations
omitted). Those states which have marital property statutes are: Arkansas; Colorado; Delaware;
District of Columbia; Illinois; Kentucky; Maine; Maryland; Minnesota; Missouri; New Jersey;
New York; North Carolina; Oklahoma; Pennsylvania; and Wisconsin. Id. at 177 n.l 1.The first
Ohio case to note the source of funds rule was Robinson v. Robinson. No. 9583 (Ohio 2d App.
Dist. May 5, 1986) (LEXIS, States library, Ohio file).
62. "[T]he characterization of property as marital or nonmarital depends upon the source of
contributions as payments are made, rather than the time at which legal or equitable title to or
possession of the property is obtained." Jakab v. Jakab, No. 90-CA-02, 1991 Ohio App. LEXIS
755, at *8 (Ohio 2d App. Dist. Feb. 22, 1991).
63. The act of placing nonmarital property in the names of both spouses is presumed to
have the effect of transmuting the nonmarital property to marital property. CLARK, supra note 3,
§ 16.2, at 185. Authorities state that joint title in separate property represents an intention that
the property become marital property. Id.
64. "This rule is favored over the blind application of a rule presuming that where property
is placed in joint title, it is presumed to be a gift from one spouse to the other. A steadfast rule
resulting in a gift to one spouse every time property is titled jointly encourages married couples to
isolate separate property in contemplation of divorce." Jakab v. Jakab, No. 90-CA-02, 1991 Ohio
App. LEXIS 755, at *8-9 (Ohio 2d App. Dist. Feb. 22, 1991). Suppose a wife and homemaker
with three small children inherits twenty thousand dollars from her parents' estate. She places this
money in a joint bank account, despite the fact that her husband is a high-ranking executive who
earns in excess of one hundred thousand dollars. In a jurisdiction that applies the concept of
transmutation strictly, the twenty thousand dollar joint checking account will be merged into the
marital estate. Consider the fairness of this result when the woman is not a member of the work
force and will most likely be awarded custody of the three children. This is money which she
received independently of her husband's efforts, yet she must share it with him. More than likely,
her husband will have little "need" for the money because of his salary. In most circumstances the
source of funds rule provides a much more equitable solution to the problem of property division.
65. See, e.g., Jakab v. Jakab, No. 90-CA-02, 1991 Ohio App. LEXIS 755 (Ohio 2d App.
Dist. Feb. 22, 1991); Wiest v. Wiest, No. 1204, 1988 Ohio App. LEXIS 1240 (Ohio 2d App. Dist.
Mar. 30, 1988); Tomlin v. Tomlin, No. 10094 (Ohio 2d App. Dist. Mar. 16, 1987) (LEXIS,
States library, Ohio file). "Equitable principles take precedence over the technicalities of the
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a. The source of funds, if any, used to acquire the property.
b. The circumstances surrounding the acquisition of the property.
c. The dates of the marriage, the acquisition of the property, the transmutation and the breakup of the marriage.
d. The inducement for and/or purpose of the transaction which gave rise
to transmutation.
e. The value of the property and its significance to the parties."

Ohio courts kept the source of funds rule within the confines of section
3105.18 by stressing that equity prevails over the operation of transmutation."7 The goal of rendering an equitable property division must not
be abandoned because transmutation often produces unfair results. 68
Since the Ohio Supreme Court in Cherry specifically stated that
property division need not be equal but merely equitable, dissatisfied
ex-wives and ex-husbands frequently appealed alimony awards under
section 3105.18 on the theory that the trial court had abused its discretion 69 in rendering the award. 0 To determine if a trial court abused its
discretion, the appellate court had to consider two questions: (1)
whether the award was equitable; and (2) whether the award fell
within the statutory guidelines.7 1 The test employed by the appellate
courts was itself discretionary, thus compounding the problem of inconsistent results. The problems that arose in conjunction with alimony
awards under section 3105.18 were attributable to the broad discretion
courts exercised and the courts' failure to distinguish between awards
that constituted alimony and those which comprised the property
division. 2
transmutation." Dunlap v. Dunlap, No. CA83-09-063 (Ohio 12th App. Dist. Sept. 28, 1984)
(LEXIS, State library, Ohio file).
66. Domestic Relations Division, supra note 42, at 501.
67. See cases cited supra note 65.
68. Cf. CLARK, supra note 3, § 16.2, at 185; Tomlin v. Tomlin, No. 10094 (Ohio 2d App.
Dist. Mar. 16, 1987) (LEXIS, States library, Ohio file).
69. "The term 'abuse of discretion' connotes more than an error of law or of judgment; it
implies that the court's attitude is unreasonable, arbitrary or unconscionable." State v. Adams,
404 N.E.2d 144, 149 (Ohio 1980) (citations omitted); see, e.g., cases cited supra note 31.
70. Kaechele v. Kaechele, 518 N.E.2d 1197, 1199 (Ohio 1988).
71. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3105.18 (Anderson 1988), amended by OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 3105.18 (Anderson Supp. 1990). "[A] domestic-relations award should be fair, equitable,
and in accordance with the law but it should not substitute its judgment for that of the trier-offact, unless the lower court's decision amounts to an abuse of discretion." Kaechele, 518 N.E.2d at
1199.
72. One early case, discussing the court's powers to adjudicate an action for alimony, stated
that "the court [has] free and full exercise of its general equity powers to adjust property rights
between opposing spouses as it determines will serve the ends of justice. Whether in the judgment
such adjustment is called 'alimony' or 'division of property' is not important." DeMilo v. Watson,
143 N.E.2d 707, 709 (Ohio 1957). But see GILCHRIST, supra note 24, § 24.10, at 380 n.66
("There is actually an important distinction between alimony payments and a property
settlement.").
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol17/iss2/28
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Generally, three factors distinguish alimony awards from property
divisions: (1) alimony awards are modifiable, while property settlements are not; (2) alimony may be enforced in a contempt proceeding
while property awards consisting of cash payments cannot be enforced;
(3) alimony payments are not dischargeable in bankruptcy proceedings
while property settlements are. 3 Given these distinctions, the classification of awards as either alimony or property division is significant because the ramifications of each vary tremendously. 7"
Section 3105.18 did not accomplish the task of distinguishing alimony from property division, but the need to do so did not go entirely
unnoticed in Ohio.
Justice Brown in his landmark decision in Wolfe v. Wolfe segregates the
guidelines in Ohio Revised Code Section 3105.18 and holds that B1, B2,
B6 and B8 are applicable in the determination of alimony in the form of
nourishment and sustenance and all the other provisions of that section
are applicable to the division of property.7"
Judicial efforts produced mere guidelines regarding the proper use of
the eleven factors in section 3105.18.
Before section 3105.171 went into effect, Ohio cases consistently
held that alimony was an amalgam of two distinctly different elements.7 1 "[A]limony is comprised of two components: a division of
marital assets and liabilities, and periodic payments for sustenance and
support."' 77 Despite the courts' recognition of the two components of
alimony, the legislature, until January of 1991, only provided courts
with one statute, from which they were to determine two remarkably
different awards. A statute as discretionary in nature as 3105.18 could
only lead to inconsistent and disparate results throughout the courts of
the state. There was no consistency of outcome among the jurisdictions
in Ohio.
III.

A.

SUMMARY OF SECTION

3105.171 OF AMENDED HOUSE BILL 514

Brief History

The history of House Bill 514 provides a solid foundation for understanding the newly enacted legislation. Work on the bill began in

73. HOMER H. CLARK, JR., THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 593
(student 2d ed. 1988).
74. Important consequences depend upon whether a particular award is labeled alimony or
a division of property. Id.
75. WALKER, supra note 11,§ 8.3, at 70.
76. See, e.g., Kaechele v. Kaechele, 518 N.E.2d 1197, 1199 (Ohio 1988).
77. Id. at 1200 (citations omitted); see also Cherry v. Cherry, 421 N.E.2d 1293, 1297
1981).
(Ohio by
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the Ohio Bar Association's Family Law Committee.7 8 Once the bill was
complete, the Legislative Drafting Subcommittee presented its proposal
to the entire Family Law Committee.7 9 The drafters of the bill are cognizant of the fact that section 3105.171 is not yet perfect.8"
B.

Overview

Section 3105.171 contains ten sections, lettered (A) through (J). 81
These ten sections represent the drafters' direct efforts to address the
problems arising from former section 3105.18. Section (A) is an extensive definitional section.8 2 Understanding the terms used throughout the
legislation is the starting point for a complete and comprehensive view
of the new property division law in Ohio. Probably the most important
section of 3105.171 is (C). 83 Referred to as "the heart of the property
division statute," 84 section (C) is the codification of the Ohio Supreme
Court's holding in Cherry v. Cherry, which states that property must
be divided equitably.8 5

78. Telephone Interview with Katherine Walsh, Chief Sponsor of House Bill 514 (Jan. 24,
1991). That committee received the charge of looking at the existing Ohio statutory authority,
section 3105.18, addressing alimony and property division. The goal of the committee was to formulate a more sophisticated statute. Seminar, supra note 25. At this time, Ohio was the only state
that had not updated its family law legislation. The Legislative Drafting Subcommittee of the
Family Law Committee worked with this difficult task for approximately three years. Id.
79. Seminar, supra note 25. From that point forward, the bill followed the traditional path
through the legislative structure. The committee accepted the proposed legislation without substantial change. Id. The bill was then brought before a screening committee of the Ohio Bar
Association, comprised of twenty members of the House of Delegates. Id. It was at this point that
the bill was subject to scrutiny from practitioners of all fields of the law. Some major changes
were made to it at this time. Id. The twenty members of the House of Delegates represented most
facets of the law. Id. Next, the bill was reviewed by the House of Delegates as a whole. It was
approved as modified by the smaller twenty-member committee. Id. Subsequently, the bill was
introduced to the Ohio legislature by its chief sponsor, Katherine Walsh of the 21st District. Id.;
Telephone Interview with Katherine Walsh, Chief Sponsor of House Bill 514 (Jan. 24, 1991).
This introduction was preceded by some major changes made by Ms. Walsh. Seminar, supra note
25. Essentially, the bill was enacted as introduced by Ms. Walsh. Id.
80.

Seminar, supra note 25.

81.

Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 3105.171 (Anderson Supp. 1990).

82.

Id. § 3105.171(A).

83.

Seminar, supra note 25.

84.

Id.

85. Cherry v. Cherry, 421 N.E.2d 1293, 1297 (Ohio
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol17/iss2/28
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C. Section (A)
Section (A) of 3105.171 defines six terms in detail.8 6 All but one
of these terms is new to the Ohio legislative scheme. 8 7 Each of the six
terms is defined with exacting scrutiny and represents an integral component of the legislation. The definition of each term will be considered
separately.
1. "Distributive Award"
"Distributive award" is the first term defined. 88 The drafters borrowed this concept from the statutes of other states.8 9 The most important idea of the distributive award embodies the source of the funds
rule. 9° A distributive award is to be made only from separate property
or income. This award must not be confused with spousal support (previously called alimony) or a distribution of marital property. The statute specifically provides that distributive awards "are made from separate property or income, and . . . are not made from marital property
and do not constitute payments of spousal support .... ." A distribu-

86. Those terms are "distributive award," "during the marriage," "marital property." "passive income," "personal property," and "separate property." OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 3105.171
(Anderson Supp. 1990).
87. Under section 3105.18 the court was to consider the duration of the marriage when
ruling on an alimony award. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3105.18 (Anderson 1988), amended by
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3105.18 (Anderson Supp. 1990). However, the term "duration of the
marriage" was not defined in the old statute.
88.

The full text of 3105.171, section (A)(1) provides:

(1) "Distributive award" means any payment or payments, in real or personal property, that are payable in a lump sum or over time, in fixed amounts, that are made from
separate property or income, and that are not made from marital property and do not
constitute payments of spousal support, as defined in section 3105.18 of the revised code.

§ 3105.171(A)(1) (Anderson Supp. 1990). See infra notes 129-37, 194-98
and accompanying text for further discussion on distributive awards.
OHIO REv. CODE ANN.

89. Seminar, supra note 25. The draft of the legislation submitted to the legislative service
contained the phrase "distribution of property" in the place of "distributive award." In compiling
the legislation to meet with standard requirements, the legislative service made this change. The
change was made because the legislative service found it dangerous to use the phrase "distribution
of property." That phrase, the service concluded, could be interpreted as meaning a distribution of
property (distributive award) or a general division of marital property. There is an important
distinction between a distribution of property (distributive award) and a general division of marital property.
90. See supra text accompanying notes 61-68 for a complete discussion of the source of
funds rule.
91.

OHfo REV. CODE ANN. § 3105.171(A)(1) (Anderson Supp. 1990). For the full text of
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tive award is a fixed award"2 comprised of separate property or
income.9 3
2.

"During, the Marriage"

The second phrase defined in section (A) is also a term of art:
"during the marriage." 94 In subsection (A)(2)(a), the statute presumes
that during the marriage will be "the period of time from the date of
the marriage through the date of the final hearing . . . 95 unless the
court finds that those dates would render an inequitable distribution of
property. If inequity would result, the court is instructed to proceed to
subsection (A)(2)(b). That section grants the court discretion to determine those dates that should be used to constitute the period during the
marriage, so that an equitable division of property can be made. 96
3.

"Marital Property"

97
A lengthy definition of "marital property" appears in (A)(3).
Marital property includes "[a]ll real and personal property that cur-

92. The legislature clearly did not want this type of award to be contingent on any happening or circumstance. It is clearly a fixed award.
93. The income can be future income. Seminar, supra note 25. The terms and guidelines for
making "distributive awards" are addressed in section (E). OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3105.171(E)
(Anderson Supp. 1990).
94. The full text of 3105.171, section (A)(2) provides:
(2) "During the marriage" means whichever of the following is applicable:
(a) Except as provided in division (A)(2)(b) of this section, the period of time
from the date of the marriage through the date of the final hearing in an action for
divorce or in an action for legal separation;
(b) If the court determines that the use of either or both of the dates specified
in division (A)(2)(a) of this section would be inequitable, the court may select dates
that is considers equitable in determining marital property. If the court selects dates
that it considers equitable in determining marital property, "during the marriage"
means the period of time between those dates selected and specified by the court.
OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 3105.171(A)(2) (Anderson Supp. 1990).
95. Id. § 3105.171(A)(2)(a). For the full text of this section see supra note 94.
96. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 3105.171(A)(2)(b) (Anderson Supp. 1990).
97. The full text of 3105.171, section (A)(3) provides:
(3)(a) "Marital property" means, subject to division (A)(3)(b) of this section, all of
the following:
(i) All real and personal property that currently is owned by either or both
of the parties, including, but not limited to, the retirement benefits of the parties, and that was acquired by either or both of the parties during the marriage;
(ii) All interest that either or both of the parties currently has in real or
personal property, including, but not limited to, the retirement benefits of the
parties, and that was acquired by either or both of the parties during the
marriage;
(iii) Except as otherwise provided in this section, all income and appreciation on separate property, due to the labor, monetary, or in-kind contribution of
either spouse or both spouses that occurred during the marriage.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol17/iss2/28
(b) "Marital property" does not include any separate property.
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rently is owned by either or both of the parties . . .[and] [a]ll interest
that either or both of the parties currently has in any real or personal
property ..
When considering what property falls within this
category, the practitioner should note that title to the property is not
determinative of whether the property will or will not be considered
marital property.
Subsection (iii) has a particularly difficult construction. That section provides that "all income and appreciation on separate property,
due to the labor, monetary, or in-kind contribution of either spouse or
both spouses that occurred during the marriage" 99 is also to be considered marital property. Here the drafters are classifying the character of
the contribution to the property instead of the nature of the property
itself. Where either or both spouses contribute finances, labor, or in an
in-kind manner toward separate property, which results in that property realizing income and/or appreciation, that income and/or appreciation is to be considered marital property. The corpus, however, remains separate property."' The section defining marital property
concludes with a clear statement that marital property does not include
separate property. 10 '
"..-98

4.

"Passive Income" and "Personal Property"

The meaning of the next two terms is straightforward and requires
little explanation. "Passive income," defined in section (A)(4), "means
income acquired other than as a result of the labor, monetary, or inkind contribution of either party.' 0 2 Passive income should be contrasted with the income previously mentioned in (A)(3)(a)(iii). 10 3 It
represents the opposite concept. Passive income is appreciation or income which is not the result of a marital contribution of either
10 4
spouse.
The shortest and simplest definition of section (A) is that of "personal property ....Personal property' includes both tangible and intangible personal property."' 0 5

Id.§ 3105.171(A)(3).
98. Id.§ 3105.171(A)(3)(a).
99. Id. § 3105.171(A)(3)(a)(iii).
100. Id. § 3105.171(A)(3)(b); see infra note 107 (the definition of "separate property").
101. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 3105.171(A)(3)(b) (Anderson Supp. 1990).
102. Id.§ 3105.171(A)(4).
103. See supra notes 99-101 and accompanying text.
104. A marital contribution arises from either spouse's contribution of labor or finances.
The legislative scheme considers the character of the contribution and whether that contribution is
income generating. Neither the nature of the property nor the title to the property is considered.
Seminar,
supra note 25.1991
Published
by eCommons,
105. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 3105.171(A)(5) (Anderson Supp. 1990).
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5. "Separate Property"
The last term defined in section (A) is."separate property." The
drafters of House Bill 514 were careful in their construction of section
3105.171 to give great deference to the concept of separate property.1 0
The statute lists seven factors, any of which will support a finding that
the property in question is separate property. 10 7 The property that falls
within the classification of separate property does so logically and without much surprise. In sum, despite any commingling, and provided that
the property can be traced, the following is presumed to be separate
property: inheritances, premarital property, passive income and appreciation, property excluded from marital property pursuant to antenuptial agreement, and compensation for personal injury.
A short sentence in subsection (A)(6)(b),' 0 8 addressing those situations where separate property becomes commingled, concludes the
definition of separate property.10 9 According to section 3105.171, even
when a couple's separate property is commingled, the property retains
status as separate property, so long as the property can be traced." 0
The drafters would like to impose the following reading upon this sec-

106. Id. § 3105.171(A)(6).
107. The full text of 3105.171, section (A)(6) provides:
(6)(a) "Separate property" means all real and personal property and any interest in
real or personal property that is found by the court to be any of the following:
(i) An inheritance by one spouse by bequest, devise, or descent during the
course of the marriage;
(ii) Any real or personal property or interest in real or personal property
that was acquired by one spouse prior to the date of the marriage;
(iii) Passive income and appreciation acquired from separate property by
one spouse during the marriage;
(iv) Any real or personal property or interest in real or personal property
acquired by one spouse after a decree of legal separation issued under section
3105.17 of the Revised Code;
(v) Any real or personal property or interest in real or personal property
that is excluded by a valid antenuptial agreement;
(vi) Compensation to a spouse for the spouse's personal injury, except for
loss of marital earnings and compensation for expenses paid from marital
assets;
(vii) Any gift of any real or personal property or of an interest in real or
personal property that is made after the date of the marriage and that is proven
by clear and convincing evidence to have been given to only one spouse.
(b) The commingling of separate property with other property of any type does
not destroy the identity of the separate property as separate property, except when
the separate property is not traceable.
Id.
108. See supra note 107 (for the text of the statute).
109. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 3105.171(A)(6) (Anderson Supp. 1990).
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol17/iss2/28
110. Id. § 3105.171(A)(6)(b).
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tion: unless the financial history of the asset cannot be traced, there is
no longer commingling or transmutation in Ohio."'
D. Section (B)
Section (B) is a general statement of the court's jurisdiction. " 2 In
divorce proceedings, the court is required to determine what property is
"marital""' and what property is "separate."" 4 Pursuant to that determination, the court is then to make an equitable distribution of the
property in accordance with the terms of the statute. 1 5 Such determination is optional in a proceeding for a legal separation. Here the court,
pursuant to a request of either party, will classify the couple's property
as either marital or separate. Property may or may not be divided in a
legal separation proceeding.
The last line of this section, which states that "the court has jurisdiction over all property in which one or both parties have an interest"' " 6 is extremely important. This is a specific statement of the
1 7
court's jurisdiction over the separate property of the spouses.
E.

Section (C)

Section (C) contains the "heart of the property division provision." 8 Subsection (C)(1) of the statute adopts provisions of the Ohio
11. See Seminar, supra note 25; Teleconference, Domestic Relations Referees, Property
Division And Spousal Support 7 (Jan. 18, 1991) [hereinafter Teleconference]; see infra notes 18393 and accompanying text (greater detailed discussion of the effect of this provision).
112. The full text of 3105.171, section (B) provides:
(B) In divorce proceedings, the court shall, and in legal separation proceedings upon
the request of either party, the court may, determine what constitutes marital property and
what constitutes separate property . . . . For purposes of this section, the court has jurisdiction over all property in which one or both parties have an interest.
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3105.171(B) (Anderson Supp. 1990).
113. For the statutory section defining "marital property" see supra note 97.
114. For the statutory section defining "separate property" see supra note 107.
115. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3105.171(B) (Anderson Supp. 1990).
116. Id.
117. Seminar, supra note 25.
118. Id. The full text of 3105.171, section (C) provides:
(C)(I) Except as provided in this division or division (E) of this section, the division of
marital property shall be equal. If an equal division of marital property would be inequitable, the court shall not divide the marital property equally but instead shall divide it between the parties in the manner the court determines equitable. In making a division of
marital property, the court shall consider all relevant factors, including those set forth in
division (F) of this section.
(2) Each party shall be considered to have contributed equally to the production and acquisition of marital property.
(3) The court shall provide for an equitable division of marital property under
this section prior to making any award of spousal support to either party under
section
3105.18 of1991
the Revised Code, and without regard to the spousal support so
Published by
eCommons,
awarded.
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Supreme Court's holding in Cherry v. Cherry.1 19 This subsection states
that the court should begin with an equal division of the marital property. 2 ' If an equal division would render an inequitable result, then
"the court shall not divide the marital property equally but instead
shall divide it between the parties in the manner the court determines

equitable."

'

Subsection (2) embodies what is arguably a presumption,

that each spouse contributed equally to the accumulation of marital
property.12 2 This language will give all courts the same starting point
for the analysis of what is an equitable contribution.
.Subsection (C)(3), like (C)(1), is a codification of pre-existing
case law.1 23 Before considering whether a particular case necessitates
an award of spousal support,' the court is to the divide the property,
according to the terms of 3105.171, between the parties to the action.
F.

Section (D)

The statute's separate property mandate is contained within section (D).1 21 "[T]he court shall disburse a spouse's separate property to
that spouse.' 2 ' All property classified as separate property according
to the definition provided in subsection (A)(6) remains the property of
its owner. Other provisions in the statute may effect the distribution of
separate property. When separate property is commingled and subse-

§ 3105.171(C) (Anderson Supp. 1990).
119. 421 N.E.2d 1293, 1297 (Ohio 1981).
120. For the statutory definition of marital property see supra note 97.
121. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3105.171(C)(1) (Anderson Supp. 1990).
122. Id. § 3105.171(C)(2).
123. "Only after a division of property is made, is the court statutorily authorized to consider whether an additional amount is needed for sustenance..
Wolfe v. Wolfe, 350 N.E.2d
413, 423 (Ohio 1976) (footnote omitted).
124. Spousal support is awarded pursuant to a new legislative section 3105.18 titled
"Spousal support." OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3105.18 (Anderson Supp. 1990). The term spousal
support replaced alimony in the Ohio Revised Code. See id. The statutory definition of spousal
support states that:
"[S]pousal support" means any payment or payments to be made to a spouse or former spouse, or to a third party for the benefit of a spouse or former spouse, that is both for
sustenance and for support of the spouse or former spouse. "Spousal support" does not
include any payment made to a spouse or former spouse, or to a third party for the benefit
of a spouse or former spouse, that is made as part of a division or distribution of property
or a distributive award under section 3105.171 of the Revised Code.
Id.
125. The full text of 3105.171, section (D) provides:
(D) Except as otherwise provided in division (E) of this section or by another provision
of this section, the court shall disburse a spouse's separate property to that spouse. If a
court does not distribute a spouse's separate property to that spouse, the court shall make
written findings of fact that explain the factors that it considered in making its determination that the spouse's separate property should not be disbursed to that spouse.
Id. § 3105.171(D).
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol17/iss2/28
126. Id.
OHIo REV. CODE ANN.
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quently cannot be traced, that property loses its identity as separate
property.1 "7 If the court determines that equity demands a distributive
award to one spouse, that award will be made from separate property,
thus rebutting the presumption that separate property will be awarded
128
to its owner individually.
G. Section (E)
Distributive awards are. the subject of section (E).1 29 The court
retains discretion to make a distributive award "to facilitate, effectuate,
or supplement a division of marital property . .. "13o
". The source of
the distributive award is separate property.1 3' The statute provides the
"utmost in protection' 31 2 to the recipient of a distributive award, since
a lien may be imposed on any property in possession of the payor to
133
secure payment of the award.
The court can make a distributive award in three instances. The
first, quoted above, essentially supplements a property division. 34 The
second instance is stated in subsection (E)(2). A distributive award can
be made in place of a division of marital property where the court
deems that a division of marital property would be "impractical or burdensome."'3 5 Finally, courts can make distributive awards where a
spouse practiced financial misconduct, presumably to the detriment of

127. Id. § 3105.171(A)(6)(b).
128. Id. § 3105.171(E)(1).
129. The full text of 3105.171, section (E) provides:
(E)(1) The court may make a distributive award to facilitate, effectuate, or supplement a division of marital property. The court may require any distributive award to be
secured by a lien on the payor's specific material property or separate property.
(2) The court may make a distributive award in lieu of a division of marital
property in order to achieve equity between the parties, if the court determines that
a division of the marital property in kind or in money would be impractical or
burdensome.
(3) If a spouse has engaged in financial misconduct, including but not limited
to, the dissipation, destruction, concealment, or fraudulent disposition of assets, the
court may compensate the offended spouse with a distributive award or with a
greater award of marital property.
Id.§ 3105.171(E).
130. Id.§ 3105.171(E)(1).
131. Id.
132. Seminar, supra note 25.
133. Id.
134. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3105.171(E)(1) (Anderson Supp. 1990); see also supra text
accompanying notes 88-93.
135. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 3105.171(E)(2) (Anderson Supp. 1990). The drafters of the
legislation relied on the following example as an illustration of when a division of marital property
would be impractical or burdensome. Suppose a husband and wife own and operate a closely held
corporation and depend upon the corporation for their livelihood. Ifthis couple divorces and itis
discovered that their corporation is one of the only valuable marital assets, the court would make
Published
by eCommons,
1991
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of dividing the corporation. The rationale is that there is no reason to
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the other spouse. 3 6 When the court finds financial misconduct to be
either a
present, it is entitled to compensate the "offended" spouse with
13 7
distributive award or a greater award of marital property.
H.

Section (F)

This section is analogous to section 3105.18(B). 8 Like its predecessor, section 3105.171(F) provides a list of factors for courts to consider when making a property division in a divorce action. Quite unlike
section 3105.18(B), the factors enumerated in section (F) are to be
used exclusively for property division.' 39 Section (F) essentially con"
tains eight factors. 'I
Only two factors, numbers (1) and (2), appearing in section
3105.171(F) are retained from the former section 3105.18(B). With
the exception of number (1), which is the duration of the marriage, the
factors contained in section 3105.171(F) address the relevant issues

disrupt a successful and operational business because the income derived from the business can be
used as financial support for both spouses even after the divorce. Seminar, supra note 25.
136. Id. § 3105.171(E)(3). The statute contemplates that financial misconduct includes
"the dissipation, destruction, concealment, or fraudulent disposition of assets." Id. This list, however, is not to be considered exhaustive. See supra note 88 (for the full text of the statutory
section on distributive award).
137. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 3105.171(E)(3) (Anderson Supp. 1990).
138. The full text of 3105.171, section (F) provides:
(F) In making a division of marital property and in determining whether to make and
the amount of any distributive award under this section, the court shall consider all of the
following factors:
(1)The duration of the marriage;
(2)The assets and liabilities
of the parties;
(3) The desirability of awarding the family home or the right to reside in the
family home, for reasonable periods of time, to the spouse with custody of the children of the marriage;
(4) The liquidity of the property to be distributed;
(5)The economic desirability of retaining intact an asset or an interest in an
asset;
(6)The tax consequences of the property division upon the respective awards to
be made to each party;
(7)The costs of sale, ifitisnecessary that an asset be sold to effectuate an
equitable distribution of property;
(8)Any division or disbursement of property made ina separation agreement
that was voluntarily entered into by the parties;
(9)Any other factor that the court expressly finds to be relevant and equitable.
Id. § 3105.171(F).
139. Id. Spousal support, or what was previously referred to as alimony, isalso governed
exclusively by a separate section. Id. § 3105.18. For discussion of the new section of 3105.18 see
supra note 124.
140. The list
isnumbered one through nine, but number nine reads: "any other factor that
the court expressly finds to be relevant and equitable." OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3105.171(F)(9)
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol17/iss2/28
(Anderson Supp. 1990).
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surrounding property division. These factors are truly economic in
nature.
It is most important to note, however, that retirement benefits, a
factor contained in former section 3105.18(B), is no longer included as
a factor in section 3105.171(F). Retirement benefits frequently
spawned litigation. The impact of retirement benefits on alimony
awards and property divisions is paramount. As a result, the drafters
moved retirement benefits to subsection (A)(3)(a)(i). While recognized
as the tenth factor to be considered when adjudicating a property division,14 1 retirement benefits are now clearly defined as marital property
in the definitional section of the statute.
I. Section (G)
The original composer of section 3105.171142 stated that the remaining four sections, lettered (G) through (J), simply contained miscellaneous provisions.14 3 The importance of these sections, however,
must not go unnoticed. Section (G) requires judges, when making a
property division pursuant to this legislation, to "make written findings
of fact that support the determination that the marital property has
been equitably divided and shall specify the dates it used in determining the meaning of 'during the marriage.' -14" The effect of this section
is to hold judges accountable for property divisions.3 4 5
J.

Section (H)

Standing alone, title does not determine whether property is to be
classified as marital or separate.14 "Except as otherwise provided in
this section, the holding of title to property by one spouse individually
or by both spouses in a form of co-ownership does not determine
whether the property is marital property or separate property. ' 14 This

141. Seminar, supra note 25.
142. During a telephone interview with Katherine Walsh, Ms. Walsh revealed that Deborah
Akers was considered the original composer of section 3105.171. Telephone Interview with Katherine Walsh, Chief Sponsor of House Bill 514 (Jan. 24, 1991). Ms. Akers stated that section (C)
was the "heart of the property division." Seminar, supra note 25.
143. Seminar, supra note 25.
144. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 3105.171(G) (Anderson Supp. 1990). The complete text of
section (G) provides:
(G) In any order for the division or disbursement of property or a distributive award
made pursuant to this section, the court shall make written findings of fact that support the
determination that the marital property has been equitably divided and shall specify the
dates it used in determining the meaning of "during the marriage."

Id.
145. Id.
146. Id. § 3105.171(H).
Published147.
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reiterates information that is contained in the definitional section of
marital property. 4 8
K.

Section (I)

"A division or disbursement of property or a distributive award
made under this section is not subject to future modification by the
court."' 4" Stated more clearly, neither property division or distributive
awards are subject to future modification by the court. This is not a
new concept in the Ohio statutory scheme.'
L.

Section (J)

Lastly, section (J) grants the court the authority to impose any
orders it deems equitable in a particular case. 15 There are a number of
orders which are eligible for application in this context. 1 2 The drafters
included two of the more common and helpful orders in the statute as
5
examples.' 1

IV.

ANALYSIS

Section 3105.171 was long overdue as a major legislative scheme
in Ohio's domestic relations law. Its enactment was prompted by
problems that Ohio practitioners confronted. Section 3105.18 was simply too vague to accomplish its purpose with uniformity. It lacked sufficient detail and guidelines for the Ohio courts to follow when ruling on
alimony awards and making property divisions. Although section
3105.18 clearly set forth eleven factors for the courts' consideration in

148. See supra notes 97-101 and accompanying text (for discussion of marital property).
This section was most likely included to clarify any confusion which might arise concerning the
operation of the theory of commingling.
149. OHIo REV. CODE ANN.§ 3105.171(1) (Anderson Supp. 1990).
150. Zimmie v. Zimmie, 464 N.E.2d 142 (Ohio 1984).
151. The full text of 3105.171, section (J) provides:
(J) The court may issue any orders under this section that it determines equitable,
including, but not limited to, either of the following types of orders:
(1) An order granting a party the right to use the marital dwelling or any other
marital property or separate property for any reasonable period of time;
(2) An order requiring the sale or encumbrancing of any real or personal property, with the proceeds from the sale and the funds from any loan secured by the
encumbrance to be applied as determined by the court.
OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 3105.171(J) (Anderson Supp. 1990).
152. Seminar, supra note 25.
153. Id.; see supra note 151 (for the full text of this statutory section). The first order
allows either party to use any marital or separate property for a reasonable period of time. OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 3105.171(J)(2) (Anderson Supp. 1990). The second order allows "the sale or
encumbrancing of any real or personal property," where the financial gain is to be applied in the
manner determined by the court. Id. Practitioners must recall that this is not an exhaustive list of
applicable orders. The drafters purposefully constructed this section vaguely to encourage creative
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol17/iss2/28
lawyering. Seminar, supra note 25.
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these claims, the statute did not instruct the courts in how the factors
should be applied. Judges developed their own methods of application.
Frustrated practitioners found it difficult to settle and appeal their
cases. They were never quite certain how the judge had reached his
ruling. The drafters of section 3105.171 considered these problems
when formulating the new statute and expect that section 3105.171 will
1 54
bring much needed consistency to the adjudication of divorce claims.
Research indicates that the creation of section 3105.171 anticipated six goals. 1 55 The drafters envisioned a detailed legislative scheme
which would codify existing case law to be used exclusively for property
division. Under this scheme, judges are provided with reasonable guidelines to follow, while preserving the integrity of their discretion, and
practitioners can counsel clients, settle, and appeal their cases with a
reasonable degree of dependability and predictability. 56 While a few
minor changes need to be made, it seems that the three years of work
that went into the formulation of section 3105.171 were not in vain. As
the new legislative scheme for property division in Ohio, section
3105.171 promises to satisfy the goals it was designed to achieve.
A.

Judicial Discretion

Section 3105.171 should bring much needed uniformity to Ohio
case holdings.1 57 Family law matters such as divorce and separation are
very personal. There will always be variance among holdings because of
the individualized nature of these claims.1 58 It would be safe to state
that no two divorce actions could ever be identical. That diversity
alone, regardless of any workable legislative scheme, will be responsible
for yielding what appears to be inconsistent results. Judicial intervention is another factor that will also naturally cause some degree of inconsistency. To compensate for this phenomenon, the legislature can
provide specific instructions to judges in how to apply the statute.1 59

154. Telephone Interview with Katherine Walsh, Chief Sponsor of House Bill 514 (Jan. 24,
1991).
155. Seminar, supra note 25.
156. Id.
157. Administrative Judge Sweeny stated:
Although many decisions are rendered by trial courts in domestic relation cases, few
opinions are written. Of the opinions written by trial and appellate courts, few are reported.
Thus it is the judges and referees who serve this great branch of the law - and who daily
render decisions affecting the lives of many people - must carry on without knowledge of
decisions their brethren are rendering in the same or similar circumstances.
Domestic Relations Division, supra note 42, at 492.
158. "[D]omestic relations courts suffer a certain lack of uniformity in their decisions above
and beyond what might otherwise be deemed reasonable." Id.
159.by When
the only1991
statute in force was section 3105.18, the Court of Common Pleas of
Published
eCommons,
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Without doubt, section 3105.171 will be applied to each- individual
case in a more uniform manner than former section 3105.18. This new
statute is, however, discretionary in some respects, which will cause results to vary within the accepted statutory guidelines. One of the drafters' goals was to preserve the integrity of judicial discretion in section
3105.171.16o Judges must be able to exercise discretion in divorce cases
because each claim is unique. Hard and fast rules are not welcome in
family law.1"' "[I]t is ill-advised and impossible for any court to set
down a flat rule concerning property division upon divorce . . .. [F]lat
'
rules have no place in determining a property division." 162
It is imperative that judges have discretion. Absent a grant to exercise discretion,
judges would be unable to render equitable results."'
It appears most logical to begin by illustrating how section
3105.171 preserves judicial discretion as compared to former section
3105.18. This is easily illustrated by contrasting section (F) of
3105.171"6 with section (B) of 3105.18.165 Section (F) delineates nine
factors for the court to consider before making an equitable division of
property. 6 While section (B) boasts two additional factors, nothing

adjudicate claims consistently within the county. Id.; see supra notes 50-54 and accompanying
text. Speaking about the use of guidelines within this context, Administrative Judge Sweeney
commented:
1 do not anticipate any sacrifice of equity nor of judicial independence . . .. [Tiheir
general use in the Division can not help but develop a measure of uniformity. With this will
come an improvement in the quality of justice, a workable basis upon which attorneys may
advise their clients and a more favorable appreciation of the legal process by the public.
Domestic Relations Division, supra note 42, at 492. Justice Sweeney articulated the same concerns as the drafters of House Bill 514.
160. Seminar, supra note 25.
161. Specific rules cannot be implemented because use of such would most likely result in a
due process violation. Id.
162. Cherry v. Cherry, 421 N.E.2d 1293, 1299 (Ohio 1981); accord Blakemore v. Blakemore, 450 N.E.2d 1140, 1143 (Ohio 1983); Berish v. Berish, 432 N.E.2d 183 (Ohio 1982); Koegel
v. Koegel, 432 N.E.2d 206 (Ohio 1982). Justice Sweeney articulated these same sentiments about
the guidelines proposed by the courts. Domestic Relations Division, supra note 42, at 492. "It
should be understood that these are not set in concrete and, with experience, may be revised from
time to time." Id.
163. Justice Brown stated:
Marriage is a union of equals. Neither party should make a profit at the expense of the
other. However, even a 50-50 property division may, in certain instances, result in one
party profiting at the expense of the other . . . . A trial court must have discretion to do
what is equitable upon the facts and circumstances of each case.
Cherry, 421 N.E.2d at 1299.
164. OHfo REV. CODE ANN. § 3105.171(F) (Anderson Supp. 1990).
165. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3105.18(B) (Anderson 1988), amended by OHio REV. CODE
ANN. § 3105.18 (Anderson Supp. 1990); see also supra note 16 (for the text of this statute).
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol17/iss2/28
166. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 3105.171(F) (Anderson Supp. 1990).
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indicates which of the eleven factors apply to property division. 1 7 Former section 3105.18, designed to address the now obsolete concepts of
sustenance alimony and property alimony, vested too much discretion
in the trial court judge. Unlike section 3105.171, which requires the
consideration of all nine factors in property division alone, the old statute left the decision of which of the eleven factors should be applied to
property division to the discretion of the trial court judge."6 8 Under
former section 3105.18, there was no common point from which to begin the consideration of property division.'6 9 Section 3105.171(F) codifies a starting point for the determination of an equitable property
1 70
division.
The ninth factor in section (F) may appear troublesome at first
glance.'
It is a "catch-all" phrase that allows the court to consider
any other factor not included in the statute if the court finds that equity demands the consideration. This section represents the drafters'
goal of preserving judicial discretion, not a grant of unyielding power to
bypass the statutory
provisions. Equity and equality are not always synonymous,1722 thus making the ninth factor essential to a legislative
scheme addressing very individualized issues.
B.

Findings of Fact

Judges are required to account for their decisions under section
3105.171 by making written findings of fact. 73 Not only will this make
settling and appealing cases easier for the practitioner, but it will also
serve as a check against the improper use of judicial discretion. Accountability tends to ensure thoughtful decisions.
Three situations under section 3105.171 require judges to make
written findings of fact. When the judge rules against a statutory presumption embodied in section 3105.171, which is clearly permissible,
the judge must explain his ruling. An equal property division is presumed in section (C);171 if an equal division would be inequitable
(which tends to be the norm), the judge must indicate the factors con-

167. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3105.18(B) (Anderson 1988), amended by OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 3105.18 (Anderson Supp. 1990).
168. Compare OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3105.171(F) (Anderson Supp. 1990) with OHIo
REV. CODE ANN. § 3105.18 (Anderson 1988), amended by OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3105.18
(Anderson Supp. 1990).
169. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3105.171 (Anderson Supp. 1990).
170. Id. § 3105.171(F); see supra note 138 (for the full text of the Ohio Revised Code
3105.171(F)).
171. Id. § 3105.171(F)(9).
172. Cherry v. Cherry, 421 N.E.2d 1293, 1298 (Ohio 1981).
173. "As of January 1, 1991, findings of fact will be required of the courts when certain
specific by
rulings
are made." 1991
Teleconference, supra note 111, at 7.
Published
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sidered in reaching the equitable result. 17 5 This mandate appears in
176
section (G).
There is a second mandate in section (G). 7 7 The dates used to
impart meaning to the term "during the marriage" are relevant to the
valuation and classification of property under 3105.171.78 The statute
presumes, in subsection (A)(2), that the dates of valuation will be the
date of the marriage to the date of the final hearing.17 The judge must
make a written finding of fact to "specify the dates . . . used indetermining the meaning of 'during the marriage.' "180 Lastly, pursuant to
section (D), the court must account for the situations where a spouse
does not receive his or her own separate property. 8 '
Mandatory court statements disclosing the bench's rationale for its
holding will yield many positive results. These required statements will
ensure the divorce client better representation since practitioners will
be more informed. Settling and appealing cases will become easier for
the practitioner and, quite possibly, some unnecessary litigation will be
eliminated. Further, these mandates will bring about consistent, well
18 2
reasoned decisions.
C.

Transmutation

The concepts of transmutation, commingling, and the source of
funds rule remain in force under section 3105.171.183 If Ohio law no
175. id. This consideration extends to distribute awards as well. Id.§ 3105.171(E), (F).
176. Id.§ 3105.171(G).
177. Id.
178. Seminar, supra note 25. This is representative of the holding in Berish v. Berish. 423
N.E.2d 183 (Ohio 1982) (the court determined that the particular dates chosen for valuation of
property are pertinent and should be identified). The court stated that:
In order to do equity, a trial court must be permitted to utilize alternative valuation
dates, such as the time of permanent separation or de facto termination of the marriage,
where reasonable under the facts and circumstances presented in a particular case. In this
fashion, the trial court will have the necessary flexibility to exercise its discretion in making
truly equitable awards consistent with legitimate expectations of the parties.
Id. at 185.
179. OHIo REV. CODE ANN: § 3105.171(A)(2) (Anderson Supp. 1990).
180. Id.§ 3105.171(G).
181. Id.§ 3105.171(D).
182. Justice Herbert R. Whiting, 'inhis comments about the guidelines proposed by the
Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas, stated that the purpose of the guidelines is the preservation of equity. Domestic Relations Division, supra note 42, at 492. It naturally follows that any
deviation from the guidelines requires written findings of fact. "The prime objective of this court
is to equitably divide the property of the parties. This objective takes precedence at all times.
However, the objective of these guidelines is similarly the preservation of equity. Any proposed
departure should therefore be approached with caution and support by appropriate authority." Id.
at 494.
183. There is evidence that the drafters sought the contrary result. See Teleconference,
supra note I 1l.An important goal that the drafters hope section 3105.171 will satisfy is consishttps://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol17/iss2/28
tency of result. It is possible that in trying to attain this result, the drafters were a little too
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longer recognized transmutation, there would be no recognition of gifts
among spouses in a marriage."" Transmutation is present in virtually
every marriage.
The status of property can be altered upon evidence that the parties
intended such a result. When this occurs it is said the property has been
transmuted. Sometimes the evidence is found in the language of a conveyance . . . . In other instances the court will infer this intent to
change status by the fact that nonmarital and marital property are
joined together, or commingled. This is particularly true in states with a
marital property presumption." 5
Because of the nature of the marital relationship, 186 property often
loses individual ownership. As a widely recognized concept in family
law, transmutation is usually accommodated by appropriate statutory
provisions, albeit impliedly in most states. Ohio was, and still is, one of
those states despite the enactment of section 3105.171.
It appears that the code will only tolerate transmutation where the
property cannot be traced. The process of tracing property represents
the legal effort of regrouping assets, such that individual ownership
may be noted. 7 This process, however, is contrary to the nature of the
marital relationship because most spouses naturally pool their resources. Hence, tracing the financial history of property, especially in
long marriages, is expensive and often fruitless.1 8

zealous in their efforts. Transmutation, which usually involves the transformation of separate
property to marital property, appears to be eliminated from the Ohio Revised Code per subsection
3105.171(A)(6)(b). One of the drafters, Deborah Akers, stated'that the theory of transmutation
caused great disparity in alimony awards. Seminar, supra note 25. Presumably, this is why the
drafters saw fit to "remove" the operation of these concepts from the Ohio Revised Code.
184. "The rationale underlying both of these doctrines [transmutation and commingling] is
that dealing with property in these ways creates a rebuttable presumption of a gift to the marital
estate."
185.

CLARK,

supra note 3, at 185.

LAWRENCE J. GOLDEN, EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION OF PROPERTY § 5.33 (1983) (foot-

notes omitted).
186. "[Tlransfers are normally motivated by love and affection and the desire to make the
gift." Mims v. Mims, 286 S.E.2d 779, 788 (N.C. 1982). A type of per se divorce planning occurs
when spouses are overtly conscious in their efforts to keep marital and separate property isolated,
and this is contrary to the notion of the marriage bond.
187. The tracing of one asset into another is a complicated legal and accounting process
which has come in for some sharp criticism. At a very basic level it does not reflect the
realities of marriage; marred partners tend to pool their resources and this obliterates the
separate identities of property. The law of tracing actually discourages this sharing and
rewards spouses who keep a running account of what is theirs. One can only surmise that
the marital bonds are not strengthened by such a practice. In addition, the proof problems
of tracing assets can be so substantial that the expense of litigation is often not worth the
effort.
GOLDEN, supra note 185, § 5.29, at 126 (footnote omitted).
188. For a discussion of some of the problems inherent in tracing property, see CLARK.
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Intent is the most important element considered in determining
ownership of traceable, transmuted or commingled property, but it is
difficult to determine at the time of divorce.189 The problem of ascertaining intent is a reason for codifying the rule that when ownership
can be traced to a particular individual, title is determinative. The
drafters noted the two very different, but necessary questions that practitioners ask when attempting to ferret out parties' intentions regarding
ownership of property. "Did you mean to give that property to your
spouse?" 19 was usually asked first, followed by "Did you mean to give
that property to your spouse if you contemplated that you might divorce some day?"' 191 Without using imagination, there are few, if any,
divorcing spouses who would answer affirmatively to each question. The
drafters, with the goals of equity and consistency foremost in their
minds, felt that the just result was to give credence only to the second
question and its response.' 9 2
The reading that the drafters wish to impose upon section
3105.171 regarding transmutation is incorrect, and does not comport
with equitable principles in property division. Further, such a reading is
contrary to the "heart" of the new statute, section (C),193 which requires that property division be equitable where an equal division of
property would cause inequity. The only way for section 3105.171 to be
a consistent statutory scheme is if transmutation is recognized, even in
those circumstances where the property can be traced, thus calling
upon the equitable considerations found in the source of funds rule to
determine an equitable allocation of the property. It is likely that

189. Cf. id. § 16.1, at 182.
190. Seminar, supra note 25.
191. Id.
192. Id. This is an incorrect approach to the problem if gifts are made within the marital
relationship, because the question ignores the parties' true intentions in most instances. Gifts simply are not made between spouses in contemplation of divorce. It is improper to consider the intent
at the time of divorce.
193. Section 3105.171(C) codifies the Cherry equitable division language, which the drafters felt was the most important provision in the bill. There is much to be said regarding the
importance of subsection (C), since an equitable division statute was long awaited in Ohio.
There is a diversity of opinion among some trial judges and even some appellate courts
as to what constitutes equity in the division of property. The Ohio Supreme Court's decision in Cherry v. Cherry, which held that there are no firm rules in these cases, did little to
bring order out of chaos. Appellate opinions are often helpful and furnish some direction.
Without doubt these opinions clearly mean that an "equitable" division does not mean an
"equal" division. The enactment of an equitable distribution statute will likely be the ultimate solution to the problem.
OHIO DOMESTIC RELATIONS LAW. supra note 34, § 25.01 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
Without doubt, these commentators did not envision an equitable division statute that abolished
the concept of transmutation in situations where the financial history of property can be traced.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol17/iss2/28
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courts will adopt this approach, such that the mandate in section (C)
will not be undercut.
D. Distributive Award
Section 3105.171 brings the well recognized distributive award
within its purview.""' This kind of award is used by many states, either
impliedly or pursuant to statutory authority. Whether a particular case
warrants a distributive award is a discretionary matter in Ohio. 9 ' Distributive awards do contemplate some specific situations' 96 and usually
make the adjudication process smoother.
The most common application of distributive awards exists when
there is marital property which should not be sold or divided.' 97 Subsection (E)(2) of 3105.171 expects cases in which dividing the marital
property would be burdensome, 98 such as when the only marital property is a home with little equity. When the marital property consists of
something akin to a general partnership, it would be most impractical
to dissolve the business in conjunction with the marriage. In most instances, it is best to leave the business intact in the hands of one spouse
while supplementing the other spouse's loss of property with a distributive award.
V.

CONCLUSION

Amended Substitute House Bill 514 modernizes the domestic relations legislation in Ohio. As stated by its chief sponsor, Amended Substitute House Bill 514 is a practitioner's bill. It represents an attempt
by the General Assembly of Ohio to resolve, those problems with which
the courts and practitioners were repeatedly confronted under the former section 3105.18.
The new section, 3105.171, exclusively outlines how a court should
divide property during a divorce proceeding. Previously in Ohio, courts
relied on one statute, former section 3105.18, to divide property and
make awards of alimony. Section 3105.171 and its major provisions
confirm the sponsor's statement that this legislation represents an effort
to codify case holdings.. When section 3105.171 is used in conjunction
with revised section 3105.18, which provides for spousal support, the
confusion between property division and spousal support is nearly eliminated. Ohio now has separate legislative sections to address the different concepts of property division and spousal support. This change

194. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3105.171(E) (Anderson Supp. 1990).
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. GOLDEN. supra note 185, § 8.07, at 246.
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makes Ohio's legislation comparable to that of other equitable distribution states. Following some minor amendments, section 3105.171
promises to improve the adjudication of divorce claims dramatically.
This long awaited legislation will provide a greater degree of consistency and fairness to litigants in divorce proceedings.
Arden Lynn Achenberg
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